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instrument. Miguel et al. (2004) – in our view, erroneously – include countries participating in civil wars in other
states. Restricting the conflict data to states with conflict on their own territory reduces the estimated impact of
economic growth on civil war. We show how spatial correlations in rainfall growth and participation in civil conflicts
induce a stronger apparent relationship in the mis-classified data.
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INTRODUCTION
In an important effort to address the potential endogeneity between economic growth and
conflict, Miguel et al. (2004) estimate the partial effect of growth on conflict in Sub-Saharan
Africa using rainfall as an instrument. Many contributions to theories of domestic conflict
have postulated that changing economic conditions are likely to strongly influence resort to
violence. Davies (1962) argued that conflict was particularly likely to occur during periods of
economic setbacks, where the gap between the aspirations of individuals based on further
economic growth and the actual economic difficulties experienced would be perceived as
particularly severe. More recently, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have argued that rebel recruit-
ment will be easier in poor societies due to lower opportunity costs in terms of foregone
income from regular economic activities when participating in insurgencies, as well as lower
wages for combatants. They use economic growth as one of their proxies for foregone income,
anticipating that conflict episodes will be preceded by low growth. Finally, Fearon and Laitin
(2003) argue that civil wars are more common in poor societies since states in low-income
societies tend to have weaker capacity for deterring and defeating violent insurgencies. From
this perspective, low or negative economic growth could be seen as an indicator of weakening
state capacity, which may increase the risk of rebellion. Many empirical studies of civil war
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360 P.S. JENSEN AND K.S. GLEDITSCH
have found evidence for a negative relationship between conflict and economic growth (see,
in particular, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).
However, it is clearly problematic to directly use observed data on economic growth for an
estimate of the causal effect of growth on conflict, since economic growth itself may be
affected by ongoing conflict or anticipated violence. Indeed, numerous empirical studies have
confirmed the negative effects of conflict on economic growth (see, e.g., reviews in Collier
et al., 2003). Murdoch and Sandler (2002, see also Murdoch and Sandler, 2004) suggest a
number of ways by which conflict may influence economic growth within a Solow growth
model (see Mankiw et al., 1992). These include the effects of conflict on labour (e.g. through
substitution into soldiering and deaths from conflict), capital (e.g. destruction of capital stock,
diverting savings into unproductive activities, and deterring investment), as well as possible
unmeasured effects such as the destruction of social capital and trust. The many theoretical
arguments and empirical studies suggesting an impact of conflict on economic growth attest
to how the potential problems of endogeneity may be very severe when assessing the effects
of economic growth on conflict.
Miguel et al. (2004) argue that weather shocks, or abrupt declines in rainfall per capita,
provide plausible instruments for economic growth in economies that depend primarily on
rain-fed agriculture, as is the case in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Their empirical study
suggests a robust negative relationship between economic growth instrumented by rainfall and
conflict incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their study has generated a great deal of interest;
As of October 2008 their paper has 48 recorded citations in the Social Science Citation Index,
which is quite impressive for a paper only appearing in print in 2004.
However, despite the innovative instrument for economic growth, we believe that Miguel
et al. (2004) use a problematic coding of conflict by including states that participate in civil
wars in other countries. We expand below on why we think their measure is problematic and
why we believe that estimates of the effects of growth of conflict should be limited to conflict
on a state’s territory. Moreover, we argue that including external participation can give
misleading estimates of the impact of growth shocks on conflict. Since droughts tend to jointly
affect neighbouring countries and countries primarily intervene in neighbouring civil
conflicts, common geographical clustering in rainfall and war participation may overstate the
causal effect. Our re-analyses of Miguel et al.’s (2004) proposed model using conflict data
restricted to location indicate a smaller impact and much less robust evidence for a negative
impact of growth on the incidence of civil conflict, and we demonstrate the effects of spatial
correlation on their original estimates.
THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION IN LINKING GROWTH AND CONFLICT
Miguel et al. (2004) use the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data (ACD) to identify civil
conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year as well as wars with more than 1000
battle-deaths (see Gleditsch et al., 2002). In brief, Miguel et al. (2004) find a significant effect
of lagged economic growth on conflict incidence with the low conflict threshold at the 5%
level, and a negative coefficient for current economic growth on major civil conflicts, signif-
icant at the 10% level.
However, upon closer inspection of their data it becomes clear that Miguel et al. (2004)
include not just African countries that see civil wars themselves, but also countries that send
troops to civil wars in other states, even when these do not experience conflict on their own
territory. We believe that it is inappropriate to include participation in civil wars in other states
to evaluate the effects of growth on conflict. Miguel et al. (2004) do not develop new theoret-
ical propositions relating growth shocks to civil war. However, the main causal arguments
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invoked from previous research seem to us to apply to conflict on a country’s territory and
specifically highlight the effects on potential insurgents. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), for
example, emphasize how poor economic performance can lower the opportunity costs for
potential insurgents from participating in insurgencies rather than regular economic activities,
and how low growth will make it easier to mobilize rebellion against the state. By contrast,
sending troops to a civil war in another country is a choice by the government, which can rely
on forced conscription irrespective of economic conditions. Moreover, it could be argued that
the logic in Fearon and Laitin (2003), who stress the role of state strength in deterring insur-
gencies and how this declines with lower income, would suggest that lower growth should
decrease the capacity of governments to commit troops to civil wars in other states and make
external participation in conflict less likely. None of the previous studies of economic growth
and civil conflict discussed in Miguel et al. (2004) examine government participation in civil
wars in other states.1
The case of Zimbabwe illustrates the difference between considering civil war locations and
participation in civil wars elsewhere. Although Zimbabwe has been affected by a series of
droughts since 1991 and sent troops to the war in the Democratic Republic Congo in 1998–99,
it did not experience violence on its own territory during this period. Rather than insurgents
taking up arms against the government under worsening economic conditions it is actually the
Zimbabwean government that forcefully drafts individuals to fight in a civil war in another
state.
In a response to previous discussions, Miguel et al. (2007) now argue that extending conflict
to troops in other countries and locations is appropriate as their ‘proposed causal mechanism
is that adverse economic shocks …make it easier to recruit fighters for civil conflicts’.
However, we believe that government recruitment by conscription is fundamentally different
from rebel recruitment and much less likely to be positively affected by economic strain. For
example, it seems unreasonable to argue that the Zimbabwean government commits forces
abroad to satisfy popular demands for alternative employment under adverse conditions.
Indeed, involvement in Congo has been generally unpopular, widely criticized as a costly
waste of resources, and the government has forcefully cracked down on protests against inter-
vention.2 If one actually wanted to consider the effect of economic conditions on decisions to
send troops to conflicts abroad, then we would need a justification for why one should only
consider civil wars elsewhere in Africa, as Miguel et al. (2004) do, and not cases where a state
sends troops to civil conflicts outside the region, such as Nigerian peacekeepers in Bosnia, or
participation in interstate wars.3
The extension to participation in civil war elsewhere in Africa does not seem consistent
with the logic of the mechanisms through which economic growth may be linked to conflict,
and we conclude that conflict should be restricted to the locations where conflict occurs, to
properly evaluate the effects of growth shocks empirically. In this paper, we compare the
results reported by Miguel et al. (2004) to new estimates when using the ACD data restricted
to location.
1 Miguel et al. (2004: 741–742) note that the results are less significant for alternative data on civil war from
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Doyle and Sambanis (2000), and Fearon and Laitin (2003), but do not offer an explana-
tion for why the results differ. Our results indicate that the reported significant results with the ACD data on major
conflicts primarily differ from the results using other conflict data sources due to their inclusion of external
participants.
2 See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/205100.stmand; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
africa/611898.stm.
3 Miguel et al. (2004: 731) state that they ‘leave an empirical analysis of the causes of conflicts between countries
for future research’. This would seem to suggest that they believe wars between states to have different causes than
civil wars, but they do not comment on why this would not be the case for the decision to commit troops to civil wars
in other states.
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ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF GROWTH ON CONFLICT RESTRICTED TO 
LOCATION
In this section we first replicate the original findings of Miguel et al. (2004) and then consider
how the estimates change when we restrict the conflict data to conflict on a state’s territory.
We provide a full list of African civil conflicts in the ACD data in Appendix A, highlighting
cases of participation in civil wars in other states coded as conflict in Miguel et al. (2004) that
we believe ought not to be included, as well as an error.4 We follow the setup of Miguel et al.
(2004) in using 2SLS estimation with growth in rainfall and its lag as instruments for
economic growth and its lag, and we refer to their paper for details on the proposed model and
data sources. Table I compares the estimates of the partial effect of growth and lagged growth
on conflict incidence when including participation as in Miguel et al. (2004) and when using
the corrected conflict data restricted to location.
For Model 1 with a minor civil conflict threshold, the estimate for the partial effect of lagged
growth is −2.41 with the corrected conflict data, compared with the −2.55 coefficient reported
by Miguel et al. (2004) when including the external participants. Miguel et al. (2004) found a
point estimate of −2.25 for lagged growth for their Model 2, including a number of country-
specific covariates from Fearon and Laitin (2003). This declines to −2.17 when using the
corrected conflict coding. Although the consequences of misclassification from including
4. Guinea is coded as at war in 1998, probably due to confusion with the war in Guinea-Bissau.
TABLE I Economic Growth and Civil Conflict (ACD 1.2a)
Civil conflicts >=25 deaths >=1000 deaths
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Miguel et al. Corrected Miguel et al. Corrected Miguel et al. Corrected
Economic Growth, t −1.13 −0.894 −0.41 −0.48 −1.48* −1.04
(1.40) (1.19) (1.48) (1.26) (0.82) (0.65)
Economic Growth, t − 1 −2.55** −2.41** −2.25** −2.17** −0.77 −0.41
(1.10) (1.09) (1.07) (1.04) (0.70) (0.62)
Log (GDP per capita), 1979 0.05 0.0071
(0.10) (0.006)
Democracy (Polity IV), t − 1 0.004 0.45
(0.006) (0.37)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.51 0.038
(0.39) (0.42)
Religious fractionalization 0.22 −0.074
(0.44) (0.22)
Oil-exporting country −0.104 −0.074
(0.22) (0.22)
Log (national population), t − 1 0.159* 0.13
(0.093) (0.09)
Log (mountainous terrain) 0.060 0.08
(0.058) (0.06)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with Huber-White robust standard error estimates clustering on countries in parenthesis.
* Significantly different from 0 in a 10% test.
** Significantly different from 0 in a 5% test.
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external participation may not seem dramatic in the case of the minor civil conflict threshold,
for the major conflict threshold in Model 3 their original −1.48 estimate for current growth
falls to −1.04 with the correct conflict coding, i.e. a drop of about 30%. This estimate also
becomes non-significant, although we note that it is still close to the 10% significance level.5
The estimates reported in Table I are based on the version of the ACD data used by Miguel
et al. (2004) to ensure comparability with their study. However, the ACD data have been
revised since then in light of new information about specific incidents, and the new and
improved data should clearly be used if we wish to assess what the best available data suggest
with regards to the plausible magnitude of the effects of economic growth on conflict. In
Table II we provide new estimates using the most recent version of the ACD data. When using
the corrected conflict coding, the estimated effects of lagged economic growth for the minor
conflict threshold become notably further reduced relative to the original estimates reported
by Miguel et al. (2004), and the size of the coefficient estimates for lagged economic growth
declines to about 75% of the original size for their Models 1 and 2. The magnitude of the
coefficient estimate for current economic growth declines even further for the high conflict
threshold in their Model 3 when using the corrected conflict coding and is no longer statisti-
cally significant. Hence, although one cannot fault Miguel et al. (2004) for not considering
5 Since Miguel et al. (2004) include two terms for economic growth, it may be more appropriate to consider their
joint significance rather than individual coefficients. F-tests here reveal generally low overall significance; The p-
value is just below 0.10 for the minor threshold, and falls from the 15% level to the 29% level for the major threshold
with the corrected conflict coding.
TABLE II Economic Growth and Civil Conflict (updated to ACD version 4–2006b)
Civil conflicts >=25 deaths >=1000 deaths
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Miguel et al. Corrected Miguel et al. Corrected Miguel et al. Corrected
Economic Growth, t −1.13 −0.356 −0.41 −0.034 −1.48* −0.998
(1.40) (1.05) (1.48) (1.19) (0.82) (0.62)
Economic Growth, t − 1 −2.55** −1.91** −2.25** −1.71** −0.77 −0.371
(1.10) (0.85) (1.07) (0.84) (0.70) (0.62)
Log (GDP per capita), 1979 0.05 0.064
(0.10) (0.082)
Democracy (Polity IV), t−1 0.004 0.0097
(0.006) (0.006)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.51 0.45
(0.39) (0.37)
Religious fractionalization 0.22 0.045
(0.44) (0.40)
Oil-exporting country −0.104 −0.08
(0.22) (0.21)
Log (national population), t − 1 0.159* 0.124
(0.093) (0.08)
Log (mountainous) 0.060 0.08
(0.058) (0.06)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with Huber-White robust standard error estimates clustering on countries in parenthesis.
* Significantly different from 0 in a 10% test.
** Significantly different from 0 in a 5% test.
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364 P.S. JENSEN AND K.S. GLEDITSCH
changes to the conflict data that have occurred after the publication of their article, it is clear
from Table II that replacing their conflict data with the most recent and improved version of
the ACD conflict data suggests a smaller impact of growth.
These results when removing countries that participate in civil wars elsewhere cast doubt
on the strength and robustness of the impact of economic growth shocks on civil conflict inci-
dence reported in Miguel et al. (2004). This is not to say that economic growth may not affect
the prospects for conflict. However, a proper estimate of the effect would need to use appro-
priate data and research design.
The reported revised results and the consequences of removing external participants in turn
raise a number of questions. First, one might ask why the effects of the misclassification or
including external participants are larger for the high conflict threshold than the low conflict
threshold. Second, why are the estimated effects of economic growth on the probability of
conflict lower for the high threshold? And third, most notably, why does including conflict
participation elsewhere yield a higher estimate of the effects of growth on conflict when this
would seem theoretically less appropriate?
The first question is relatively easy to answer as including states participating in conflict
elsewhere has much greater effects on the conflict incidence vector on the left-hand side in the
case of the model with the high conflict threshold than in the case of the low conflict threshold.
As can be seen from Appendix A, we have a much smaller share of remaining country-year
instances of conflict incidence at the high threshold when we remove external participation in
civil wars in other states than when we remove external participants without conflict on their
own territory at the low conflict threshold. This is the case since several of the countries that
participated in high intensity conflicts elsewhere also had conflicts on their own territory that
exceeded the low conflict threshold (i.e. at least 25 deaths), but these conflicts did not reach
the high conflict threshold of at least 1000 deaths in one calendar year. In this sense, the
measurement error introduced by including the external participants is more severe for the
high conflict threshold.
The second question is more difficult to answer conclusively. We first note that the difference
in the estimated effects of growth for the two different conflict thresholds as well as the differ-
ence in the lag structure were also present in the original results presented by Miguel et al. (2004)
, who acknowledge these differences, but do not offer an explanation for them. One possible
interpretation is that if growth shocks have some causal impact on conflict, but their effect is
limited, then it is unlikely that a growth shock alone would have sufficient impact on the oppor-
tunity costs of potential insurgents to allow recruiting an organization large enough to generate
sufficient violence to exceed the 1000 battle-deaths threshold. Large scale escalation or major
civil war is likely to require a much higher level of organization and successful collective action
than small insurgencies. It seems likely that differences in organizational capacity and the ability
to achieve successful collective action would be related to various pre-existing political
characteristics and grievances unlikely to be captured in the right-hand side factors included
in the model. As such, it is not so surprising that the marginal effect of economic growth is
much weaker for the smaller set of conflicts that have escalated beyond the high threshold.
With regards to the third question, it seems at first counterintuitive that a theoretically less
appropriate conflict measure should yield stronger evidence for an impact of growth on
conflict. Measurement error in the dependent variable will generally introduce added noise
and decrease confidence in the estimated effects of right-hand-side variables. However, the
estimated size of coefficients may be inflated when the source of error is correlated with the
explanatory variables. In this case, the apparently stronger results reported by Miguel et al.
(2004) when including conflict participation may arise from spatial clustering in their data on
growth in rainfall and patterns of external participation in civil wars. We investigate this issue
empirically in the following section.
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THE IMPACT OF SPATIAL PATTERNS IN RAINFALL AND CONFLICT 
PARTICIPATION
Physical phenomena such as rainfall and drought often display spatial clustering, and as such
it is likely that measures of growth in rainfall will be similar among geographically close coun-
tries. Easterly and Levine (1999) demonstrate spatial clustering in economic growth among
African states, although they do not evaluate whether this may be due to common geographical
shocks such as droughts. Moreover, conflict participation tends to follow geographical
patterns, as neighbouring states are more likely to intervene or provide assistance in an ongo-
ing civil war than more distant countries (see Gleditsch, 2002).
In this specific case we find that many of the additional conflict observations that arise when
including participants in civil wars elsewhere come from states that suffer exceptional
droughts in Southern and Western Africa over the period. Growth in rainfall in these misclas-
sified observations is often substantially below country and global averages over the time
period, as can be seen in Table III for the low conflict threshold and Table IV for the high
conflict thresholds. Moreover, there is also a regional trend in that the states that participate in
civil war in other states tend to intervene in neighbouring countries. Hence, as neighbouring
countries also have similar low growth in rainfall, including participating states may induce
bias that appears to strengthen the effects of growth shocks on conflict incidence.
We assess the extent and impact of spatial correlation more formally by using common
measures and techniques from spatial econometrics. Assessing spatial clustering requires us
TABLE III Growth in Rainfall for Misclassified Cases Relative to Country Average, Any Conflict
Growth in rainfall
Country Misclassified years Average
Burkina Faso (1990) 0.070 0.021
Guinea (1998–99) −0.001 −0.003
Namibia (1998–99) 0.007 0.159
Rwanda (1996) 0.015 0.006
Zaire (1981–89) 0.035 −0.006
Zimbabwe (1998–99) −0.044 0.034
(Global mean) −0.080
TABLE IV Growth in Rainfall for Misclassified Cases Relative to Country Average, Major Conflict Threshold
Growth in rainfall
Country Misclassified years Average
Angola (1997) −0.063 0.014
Burkina Faso (1990) −0.201 0.021
Chad (1998–99) 0.146 0.023
Guinea (1998) 0.065 −0.003
Namibia (1998–99) 0.007 0.159
Rwanda (1997, 1999) 0.019 0.006
South Africa (1984–85) 0.098 0.015
Uganda (1998–99) 0.001 0.019
Zaire (1981–89) 0.035 −0.006
Zimbabwe (1998–99) −0.044 0.034
(Global mean) −0.080
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to first specify the hypothesized connectivities between the individual observations (see
Anselin, 1988). Typically, this is done through a binary connectivity matrix C, where each
element cij = 1 if two units i and j are ‘neighbors’ or connected by some criterion and cij = 0
otherwise. In this case, we expect states that are ‘close’ to be more similar on rainfall and
conflict participation. In the absence of clear expectations of the specific reach of spatial
dependence and since this may well differ for rainfall or conflict participation we consider
two plausible criteria based on the minimum distance between the outer boundaries of states,
using data from Gleditsch and Ward (2001). The first criterion considers states connected if
within 100 km of one another. This includes states that have directly contiguous borders as
well as states that are near contiguous or separated by short stretches of water. Our second
criterion includes connectivities up to 800 km. This provides a more encompassing measure
of a state’s regional context (Gleditsch, 2002), and also corresponds to the connectivity
measures used by Murdoch and Sandler (2004) in their study of the spill-over effects of
conflict on economic growth.
We first assess the extent of spatial correlation by considering the Moran’s I statistic for
rainfall per capita, conflict participation, and war participation (i.e. the high conflict thresh-
old). The Moran’s I statistic is a common measure of the similarity between the values of a
variable y for one unit i and its neighbours j. The formula for Moran’s I is 
The variance for the Moran’s I can be derived based on assumptions about sampling. This
in turns allows testing for the significance of spatial clustering in y, using the deviations
from the expected value, i.e. Z = [I − E(I)]/SE(I). We refer to Schaenberger and Gotway
(2005:18–22) and Ward and Gleditsch (2008) for further details. Table V displays Moran’s I
correlation coefficients for the two distance thresholds, with significant correlations flagged
based on the estimated variance assuming random sampling. As can be seen from Table V, we
find significant positive spatial clustering or similarity in rainfall growth in 17 out of 19 years
in our sample at the 100 km threshold. For the 800 km threshold we find significant positive
spatial clustering for 14 out of the 19 years in the sample. Whereas the evidence for spatial
clustering in rainfall seems to decline somewhat with the more encompassing threshold, we
find that the opposite is the case with conflict participation. More specifically, we find signif-
icant spatial clustering in conflict participation in 1996, 1997, and 1998 at the 100 km thresh-
old, as well as 1982, 1984–85, and 1988 with the 800 km threshold. For war participation or
conflict at the high threshold we find significant correlations for 1998 and 1997 at the 100 km
threshold, as well as 1983–89, 1991, and 1993 for the 800 km threshold. In particular, we note
that we see evidence of spatial clustering in conflict in precisely those years where we see
many additional cases of participation in civil war included in Miguel et al. (2004) where the
states involved did not have conflict on their own territory.
Although these descriptive measures suggest considerable spatial clustering in these data it
is possible that some of this clustering could disappear when we condition on the other inde-
pendent variables in the Miguel et al. (2004) model that may be spatially clustered in similar
ways. Moreover, Miguel et al. (2004) also consider a variety of robustness tests such as coun-
try fixed effects in their model specifications, and these robustness tests are sometimes
suggested as helpful for addressing the potential effects of spatial correlation. To assess how
spatial correlation may have affected their reported estimates more systematically we estimate
a so-called spatially lagged y model, where we add to the right-hand side of the model a spatial
lag, or a term indicating whether neighbouring states are involved in conflict based on the
I
N c y y y y
c y y
ij i jji
ijji ii
? ? ?? ? ??? ? ?
( )( )
( )2
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product of a row-normalized connectivity matrix W and y itself, i.e. Wy. If many incidents in
the Miguel et al. (2004) conflict coding stem from participation in neighbouring states, then
we should see a positive coefficient for the spatial lag of y. Furthermore, if we have common
clustering in conflict participation and rainfall, then the estimated effect of growth instru-
mented by rainfall may decline when we take into account the spatial clustering in conflict.
The presence of the spatial lag of y on the right hand side of the model creates a problem of
simultaneity, and we estimate the model using X, WX, and W2X as instruments for the spatial
lag Wy. We refer to Anselin (1988) and Ward and Gleditsch (2008) for further details on the
spatially lagged y model and estimation.
Table VI reports the findings for Miguel et al.’s (2004) Models 2 and 3 with spatial lags of
conflict for the original and corrected data, using the 100 km and the 800 km thresholds. The
positive coefficient estimates for the spatial lag in Model 2 for the conflict coding including
participation indicate that conflict incidence (in the wide sense, i.e. including conflict that takes
place elsewhere) is much more likely when conflict is recorded for a neighbouring state. The
coefficient estimate for the spatial lag using Miguel et al.’s (2004) original data including
participation falls just short of significance at the 0.1 level for the low conflict threshold in
Model 2 at the 100 km distance threshold.6 However, the coefficient estimate for the spatial
lag is large and significant for the model when estimated with the 800 km threshold, suggesting
considerable spatial clustering in the data when including participants in conflict in other states.
6 We note, however, that it is significant at the 11% level. Moreover, the ratio of the estimated spatial lag coeffi-
cient in this model to its standard error is higher than the ratio of the coefficient for current economic growth in
Model 3 in Table I to its standard error.
TABLE V Moran’s I Statistics for Spatial Clustering
Precipitation per capita Conflict participation War participation
Year 100km 800 km 100km 800 km 100km 800 km
1999 0.038 −0.111 0.109 0.033 0.089 0.002
1998 0.44** 0.306** 0.175** 0.096** 0.222** 0.092**
1997 0.027 −0.02 0.174** 0.119** 0.181** 0.087**
1996 0.302** 0.301** 0.233** 0.125** −0.037 −0.029
1995 0.449** 0.254** −0.095 0.02 −0.037 −0.029
1994 0.453** 0.324** 0.04 −0.03 −0.023 −0.027
1993 0.501** 0.415** −0.193 −0.048 −0.086 0.053*
1992 0.607** 0.496** −0.221 −0.087 −0.149 0.008
1991 0.466** 0.295** 0.008 −0.013 0.029 0.114**
1990 0.2** 0.165** −0.203 −0.074 −0.131 −0.059
1989 0.302** 0.114** −0.012 0.04 0.055 0.132**
1988 0.198** 0.009 0.062 0.116** 0.053 0.065*
1987 0.16** 0.04 −0.028 0.034 0.053 0.065*
1986 0.341** 0.2** −0.005 0.046 0.053 0.065*
1985 0.214** 0.09** 0.062 0.116** 0.053 0.065*
1984 0.191** 0.037 0.036 0.132** 0.053 0.065*
1983 0.315** 0.316** −0.014 0.042 0.053 0.065*
1982 0.528** 0.363** 0.04 0.12** −0.097 0.031
1981 0.588** 0.301** −0.184 −0.067 −0.097 0.031
Note: Entries are Moran’s I correlation coefficients.
** denotes entries that are significantly different from 0 in a 5% test, based on an estimate of the variance assuming randomization.
* denotes entries that are significantly different from 0 in a 10% test, based on an estimate of the variance assuming randomization.
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Comparing the results in Table VI to the results originally reported by Miguel et al. (2004)
in Table I indicates a further decline in the estimates for lagged economic growth at the lower
conflict threshold when controlling for spatial correlation. The original estimate for the
conflict coding with external participation, i.e. −2.25, is over 30% higher than the −1.73 esti-
mate for lagged economic growth in the model including the spatial lag in the model with the
100 km distance threshold.7 The coefficient estimate is smaller yet in the model at the 800 km
distance threshold, and is no longer statistically significant at conventional significance levels.
Hence, even if one actually believes that participation in conflicts in other states should be
included in a reasonable measure of conflict ‘incidence’, it will be important to consider the
possible spatial correlation in conflict when estimating the effect of growth on conflict. We
thus conclude that there seems to be considerable spatial clustering in the conflict incidence
7The coefficient for xk in a spatially lagged y model is not directly comparable to its counterpart in a model with-
out the spatial lag, since this indicates the immediate impact of a change in xk without the feedback implied by the
model. With a spatially lagged y, a change in a right-hand side xk for country i will first change yi directly, and then
indirectly, through the effect of yi on the neighbours of i, which in turn feeds back onto i, and reverberates through
the system until reaching a new equilibrium. The full ‘equilibrium impact’ hence also depends on the spatial multi-
plier (I − ρW)−1, where ρ indicates the parameter for the spatially lagged y (see Ward and Gleditsch, 2008). In this
case, the median equilibrium effect is −1.75, still substantially lower than the original estimate.
TABLE VI Economic Growth and Civil Conflict, Spatial Lag Estimates
Civil conflicts >=25 deaths >=1000 deaths
Model 2 Model 3
Miguel et al. Corrected Miguel et al. Corrected
100km 800km 100km 800km 100km 800km 100km 800km
Economic Growth, t −0.077 0.698 −0.031 0.644 −1.283 −0.233 −1.032* −0.449
(1.297) (1.256) (1.158) (1.149) (1.037) (0.893) (0.57) (0.629)
Economic Growth, t − 1 −1.734* −1.624 −1.703** −1.797* 0.149 −0.778 −0.364 −0.691
(0.985) (1.167) (0.825) (0.955) (1.134) (0.796) (0.612) (0.462)
Log (GDP per capita), 1979 0.05 0.021 0.063 0.039
(0.084) (0.09) (0.075) (0.085)
Democracy (Polity IV), t − 1 0.005 0.007 0.01* 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 0.606* 0.666* 0.448 0.555
(0.364) (0.386) (0.36) (0.378)
Religious fractionalization −0.015 −0.033 0.041 −0.075
(0.412) (0.436) (0.385) (0.398)
Oil-exporting country −0.13 −0.207 −0.075 −0.119
(0.21) (0.209) (0.185) (0.203)
Log (national population) 0.151* 0.152* 0.124 0.117
(0.085) (0.088) (0.079) (0.082)
Log (mountainous terrain) 0.025 −0.002 0.075 0.044
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065)
Spatial lag of conflict 0.199 0.413** 0.004 0.217 0.108** 0.423** −0.012 0.173**
(0.122) (0.18) (0.131) (0.174) (0.047) (0.111) (0.131) (0.066)
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 743
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with Huber-White robust standard error estimates clustering on countries in parenthesis.
* Significantly different from 0 in a 10 percent test.
** Significantly different from 0 in a 5 percent test.
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data including participation. However, this appears to by driven largely by including partici-
pating states. The estimate for the spatial lag is close to zero with the corrected data restricted
to location at the 100 km threshold and is not significant, albeit larger, at the 800 km threshold.
The results are somewhat mixed for Model 3 with the high conflict threshold and country-
specific fixed effects. We find significant evidence of positive spatial clustering for the original
Miguel et al. (2004) conflict coding including external participation at both the 100 km and
the 800 km distance thresholds. The estimate for contemporary economic growth is not signif-
icant in either of these model estimates and far from conventional levels of significance. For
the corrected conflict data we find a smaller, yet statistically significant, coefficient for lagged
economic growth at the 100 km threshold, whereas the coefficient is non-significant in the
model at the 800 km threshold. The coefficient for the spatial lag of conflict is significant in
the model at the 800 km threshold, but non-significant and even has a negative sign in the
model at the 100 km threshold. We are hesitant to conclude too much from these results since
this model includes country fixed effects, as in practice it is often difficult to identify both
country fixed effects and spatial lags with much precision in the same model (see, for example,
Elhorst, 2003). However, this in our view reconfirms the lack of stability for the results of
current economic growth on conflict at the high threshold, and we believe that these results in
general again demonstrate the importance of considering the possible spatial correlation in
conflict when estimating the effects of economic growth on conflict.
CONCLUSION
We argue that a closer look at the suggested causal mechanisms linking growth and civil war
does not make it reasonable to include external participation in civil conflicts elsewhere. We
have documented how an inappropriate coding of conflict including participation influences
the estimates of the effects of growth on conflict reported in Miguel et al. (2004), and how the
estimated effects of growth are notably smaller when we use a theoretically appropriate coding
restricted to location. Furthermore, spatial correlation in growth in rainfall and conflict parti-
cipation – especially in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) – leads to a
higher estimate of the effects of growth on conflict incidence. These cases do not seem to be
consistent with the argument that adverse economic conditions make it easier to mobilize
fighters in civil wars.
We emphasize again that the effects of economic growth on conflict is a topic worthy of
investigation, and that rainfall may be a very useful instrument for growth in countries where
rain-fed agriculture is the dominant economic activity. However, investigating the impact of
growth on conflict also requires that we carefully detail the theoretical linkages and use appro-
priate research designs and data. Although space precludes us from further discussion here, we
believe that research on these issues can be enhanced through data disaggregated below the
nation state and more comprehensive violence data, and preliminary research supports these
conjectures.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARISON OF MIGUEL ET AL. (2004) AND CORRECTED 
CONFLICT CODING
TABLE AI Civil Wars >=1000 Deaths per Year
Country Miguel et al. (2004) coding Corrected and updated
Angola 1981–94, 1997–99 1975–94, 1998–2001. Sample for estimation only in-
cludes until 1999
Participated in DRC war in 1997
Benin No civil wars No civil wars
Burkina Faso 1990 Participated in Liberia in 1990
Burundi 1998 1998
Cameroon No civil wars No civil wars
Central African 
Republic
No civil wars No civil wars
Chad 1965–88, 1990, 1998–99 1965–88, 1990. Participated in in the DRC war 1998–99
Congo Brazzaville 1997–99 Only >= 1000 in 1997–98. 1999 is included in older
versions
Congo, DR/Zaire 1981–89, 1997–2000 Listed as participant in Angola 1981–89, 1997–2000 in 
old versions
Djibouti No civil wars No civil wars
Ethiopia 1976–91 1976–91
Gabon No civil wars No civil wars
Gambia No civil wars No civil wars
Ghana No civil wars No civil wars
Guinea 1998 No civil wars (but conflict in Guinea–Bissau)
Guinea–Bissau 1998 1998
Ivory Coast No civil wars No civil wars
Kenya No civil wars No civil wars
Lesotho No civil wars No civil wars
Liberia 1990 1990 (1992, 2003 not included because of data avail-
ability for growth)
Madagascar No civil wars No civil wars
Malawi No civil wars No civil wars
Mali No civil wars No civil wars
Mauritania No civil wars No civil wars
Mozambique 1981–92 1981–92
Namibia 1998–99 Participated in DRC war 1998–99
Niger No civil wars No civil wars
Nigeria No civil wars No civil wars
Rwanda 1991–92, 1997–99 1991–92, 1998. Participated in DRC war 1997–1999
Senegal No civil wars No civil wars
Sierra Leone 1998–99 1998–99
South Africa 1980–93 1980–83, 1986–88. Older versions include war in 1989–
93. Participated in Angolan war 1975–89
Sudan 1983–92, 1995–2002 1983–92, 1995–2002
Swaziland No civil wars No civil wars
Tanzania No civil wars No civil wars
Togo No civil wars No civil wars
Uganda 1981–1988, 1989, 1991,
1998–99
1981–1988, 1989, 1991 participated in DRC war
1998–99
Zambia No civil wars No civil wars
Zimbabwe 1998–99 No civil wars. Participates in the DRC war 1998–99
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TABLE A2 Civil Wars >= 25 Deaths per Year
Country Miguel et al. (2004) coding Corrected and updated
Angola 1981–1999 1981–1999
Benin No conflict No conflict
Burkina Faso 1987, 1990–91 1987. Participates in Liberia 1990–91
Burundi 1990–92, 1995–99 1991–92, 1994–99, in new ACD
Cameroon 1984 1984
Central African Republic No conflict No conflict
Chad 1981–94, 1997–99 1981–94, 1997–99
Congo–Brazzaville 1997–99 1993–94, 1997–99
Congo, DR/Zaire 1981–89, 1996–1999 1996–1999. Participates in Angola 1981–89 
older ACD versions
Djibouti 1991 1991
Ethiopia 1981–91, 1996–99 1981–91, 1996–99
Gabon No conflict No conflict
Gambia 1981 1981
Ghana 1981,1983 1981,1983
Guinea 1998–99 No conflict
Guinea Bissau 1998–99 1998–99
Ivory Coast No conflict No conflict
Kenya 1982 1982
Lesotho 1998 1998
Liberia 1989–91 1989–91 (1992, 2003 not included because 
of data availability)
Madagascar No conflict No conflict
Malawi No conflict No conflict
Mali 1990, 1994 1990, 1994
Mauritania No conflict No conflict
Mozambique 1981–92 1981–92
Namibia 1998–99 Participates in the DRC war 1998–99
Niger 1990–92, 1994, 1996–97 1992, 1994, 1996–1997, due to ACD 
changes
Nigeria No conflict No conflict
Rwanda 1990–94, 1996–99 1990–94, 1997–99. Participates in the DRC 
in 1996
Senegal 1990, 1992–93, 1995, 1997–99 1990, 1992–93, 1995, 1997–99
Sierra Leone 1991–99 1991–99
South Africa 1981–93 1981–88; 1989–93 removed in updated 
ACD
Sudan 1983–99 1983–99
Swaziland No conflict No conflict
Tanzania No conflict No conflict
Togo 1986, 1991 1986, 1991
Uganda 1981–1991, 1994–99 1981–1991, 1994–99
Zambia No conflict No conflict
Zimbabwe 1998–99 Participates in DRC war in 1998–99
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